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1. Introduction 
Models of wage bargaining often assume that unions have an objective function with two 
elements: wages and employment (Farber, 1978; MacDonald and Solow, 1981; Grossman, 
1983; Blair and Crawford, 1984). Hence, they implicitly adopt the conjecture that union 
members or the union leadership have other-regarding or social preferences (Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; 
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) for those who are non-employed or those who would have to fear 
unemployment in case of rising wages. On the other hand, insider-outsider models of wage 
bargaining (Linbeck and Snower, 1989) are based on the premise of discrimination between 
insiders (union members) and outsiders (not members of the union). 
In this paper, we assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage 
bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. A laboratory experiment allows inferring 
underlying preferences better than data from the field that may be contaminated by factors 
that are very hard to control for, such as the organization and decision making procedures 
within a union, inter-temporal aspects of wage setting, unobserved incentives or objectives of 
union members and so on. Nonetheless, we view our results as complementary to findings 
based on field data of union wage bargaining behavior. We are not aware of any other 
laboratory or field experiment that addresses the question of to what extent employment is 
taken into account in collective wage bargaining. 
In our experiment, we set up a stylized labor market with five heterogeneously 
productive workers, and we vary the number of union members exogenously. In one 
treatment, all workers are union members that decide on the joint wage level, and in another 
treatment three out of five (the three most productive workers) are union members. We 
choose the three most productive workers to be union members to maximize the potential 
conflict among workers in our setup, without implicating that such a union membership is 
most realistic. Workers face a (fictitious) firm that bases its employment decision 
deterministically on the wage rate, and the employment schedule contingent on the wage is 
common knowledge. The decision making process within the union is captured by a median 
voting system, i.e. the median wage proposal of the workers who are eligible to vote (five or 
three) determines the actual wage and, consequently, the employment level. In order to make 
wage proposals of all union members fully incentive compatible, and not only the proposal of 
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the median voter, we introduce a probability q with which the median proposal would become 
implemented instead of the individual proposal. The probability will be an important 
treatment variable in our experiment that gradually transforms the voting game into an 
individual allocation task. Specifically, with q = 0 the problem reduces to an individual 
allocation task akin to a dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994)1 but still 
with a well-defined job market frame. 
Our results indicate that proposals in the main treatments with a low level of q are very 
close to the selfish benchmark. Highly productive workers do not take employment of low 
productive workers into account when they make their wage proposals. Interestingly, there is 
no significant difference between the insider-outsider treatment (with three voters) and the 
all-workers treatment (with all five workers voting). 
Several explanations for the low level of social preferences – when compared to results 
from more general allocation games (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 
2004) and to results from the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; 
Eckel and Grossman, 1996; List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008) – are conceivable. 
One possible explanation is the framing of our decision making situation as the decision 
making problem of a union. However, most research on social distance (Hoffman et al., 1996; 
Bohnet and Frey, 1999) and social identity (Tajfel et al., 1971; Charness et al., 2007; Chen 
and Li, 2009; Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Sutter, 2009) in the realm of other-regarding 
preferences would indicate that our framing should, if anything, discriminate in favor of the 
in-group (union) members, e.g. by amplifying other-regarding behavior towards other union 
members. In other words, the minimal group paradigm could be applicable in our setup when 
union members perceive themselves as part of a group. The social distance between union 
members would be decreased. As a consequence, union members should tend to take other 
union members’ employment into account in the wage setting, and one would expect a 
treatment difference between the insider-outsider and the all-workers treatments. Even if in-
group favoritism were not to work in the direction of positive discrimination towards in-group 
members, but rather in terms of negative discrimination, we should observe a difference in 
                                                 
1 The standard dictator “game” is a two-person allocation task in which one person (the “dictator”) 
receives a positive endowment and can transfer any amount between zero and the endowment to a powerless 
recipient. 
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behavior between these two treatments. However, such reasoning is not borne out by the data 
from our experiment. 
A second explanation coming from research on group decision making in economics 
and social psychology could also be plausible in our context. Group membership leads 
individuals to more selfish decisions if they cannot be held accountable2 individually for their 
choices (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Kugler et al., 2007; Luhan et al., 2009). Group members 
have the possibility to “hide” behind others because they are non-identifiable (e.g., Insko et 
al., 1987, 1988; Güth et al., 1996; Abbink and Herrman, 2011). The social demands or moral 
costs of the decision problem are therefore reduced (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Zizzo, 
2010; Abbink and Herrman, 2011). Whereas the majority of research has been conducted with 
groups in which group members can interact directly (through a real-time chat or face-to-face 
communication), our setup does not allow for a group interaction beyond the voting 
mechanism that determines final wages.3 
In order to test whether accountability of single group members influences the extent of 
other-regarding preferences, i.e. the concern for overall employment, we vary the probability 
q exogenously. A decreased q should increase other-regarding preferences, and this 
hypothesis is indeed borne out by the data. However, the sensitivity of other-regarding 
preferences to q is not very large. It is important to stress the methodological contribution that 
comes in passing with our variation in q. In a between-subject design we gradually transform 
a voting game into an individual allocation task, presumably increasing the perceived 
accountability of participants in the laboratory. This is done without changing the basic setup 
and instructions of the decision making problem at hand. 
Our study provides evidence for the extent to which productive workers take the 
employment decision of firms and, consequently, the outcome of less productive workers into 
account. Our stylized setting abstracts from several important features of collective wage 
bargaining in the real world, but it shows that collective decisions might do a poorer job in 
                                                 
2 For accountability research in the context of risky decision making see Pahlke et al. (2011) and Vieider 
(2011). The term “moral wiggle room” has also been used to describe decisions in which one finds an easy 
excuse for a selfish decision (Dana et al., 2007). 
3 This might itself have an effect on behavior, but we are not aware of any study that alters the level of 
interaction within a group systematically (see also Kocher and Sutter, 2007). 
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taking the least productive into account than individual (dictator) decisions. Put differently, 
our results indicate that there is what we may label an accountability effect: increasing the 
level of individual accountability in allocation decisions has the potential to increase the 
importance of other-regarding concerns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the details of our 
experimental design and provides theoretical hypothesis. In Section 3 we present the 
experimental results, first on an aggregate level, focusing on treatment differences, and then 
on the basis of a regression analysis. Section 4 discusses our findings and concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Experimental design and theoretical predictions 
2.1. Experimental design of the main part 
The main part of the experiment introduced groups consisting of five randomly assembled 
participants that we referred to as workers in the experimental instructions (see the online 
appendix for a specimen). Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity; in the 
experiment we told participants that there were different types (type 1 to type 5, with type 1 
being most productive) for which different wage ranges would allow the firm to employ them. 
Type 1 would be employed for every permissible wage, type 2 for a smaller wage range 
starting below the maximum wage, and so on. Details are given in Table 1. 
Depending on the treatment, either all five (all-workers treatment; denomination INS in 
the following) or only the three most productive workers (insider-outsider treatment; 
INSOUT) were eligible to determine the wage level. In the former case there are no outsiders 
on the market, in the latter case there are two outsiders, and our design assigns the roles 
exogenously. More specifically, always the more productive workers are insiders in our 
experiment to maximize the potential conflict among workers. The wage level determines the 
number of employed workers (see Table 1). All employed workers earn the wage, and 
unemployed worker earn zero. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
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The voting procedure to determine the wage is as simple as possible: the median wage 
proposal of the eligible workers out of the permissible wage range, ]100,1[∈w , was 
implemented. As the second treatment variable we vary the probability q with which the 
median proposal out of the proposals of the union members would become implemented 
instead of a randomly selected individual proposal from the set of the union members (with 
probability 1 – q). The variable q is intended to adjust the level of accountability, and it makes 
sure that, with q < 1, not only the proposal of the median proposer is fully incentive-
compatible. The variable q is set at 0.8, 0.2 and 0 in different treatments of our experiment. 
The uncertainty coming from q is resolved after making a wage proposal in the treatments 
with q = 0.8 and q = 0.2. In the treatments with q = 0, we implement one treatment in which 
participants in the experiment learn only ex post whether one is the “dictator” in determining 
the wage (denoted EX-POST), and one in which the “dictator” knows it already before 
determining the wage (EX-ANTE). The latter treatment further increases accountability. 
Table 2 summarizes the conditions applied in our experiment, and Figure 1 gives a graphical 
overview. The treatment variation is implemented between experimental subjects. 
 
(Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here.) 
 
The determination of the wage is repeated ten times. Types and groups of workers 
remain constant over these ten periods.4 At the end of each period, the common wage is 
announced and everybody sees whether he or she is employed or not. Workers of type 4 and 
type 5 in the THREE treatments also receive this information, but they cannot submit a wage 
proposal. Individual proposals are not revealed, but workers learn whether it was the median 
proposal that was implemented or a randomly chosen proposal of the eligible workers (if 
applicable). In the EX-ANTE treatments, we asked those workers who knew that they were 
not going to determine the actual wage level to provide us with the wage level that they would 
have chosen, had they been selected as the dictator. These choices are of course not 
incentivized. 
 
                                                 
4 For reasons of comparability to experiments planned in the future, we decided to frame the ten decisions 
as five periods, each consisting of two identical stages, in the experimental instructions. 
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2.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Following McDonald and Solow (1981), we describe a model of wage bargaining with non-
linear preferences for union members. We assume that there are five workers, each indexed 
by subscript i, i = 1,2,3,4,5. Workers are ranked in terms of their productivity level, Qi, as 
follows: Q1 > Q2 > Q3 > Q4 > Q5. There are no costs associated with effort. A worker is 
employed if Qi ≥ w, the wage offered by the firm. In the first version of our model, only the 
three most productive workers vote. In the second version, all five workers vote. The voting 
procedure is identical to the one outlined in Section 2.1, but to make the exposition simpler 
and more compact, we only consider one value of q, namely, q = 0.8. In other words, in our 
theoretical setting the median wage proposal out of the permissible wage range, ]100,1[∈w , is 
implemented with an eighty percent probability. For the remaining twenty percent of the time, 
one of the wages submitted by workers 1, 2, or 3 in treatment INSOUT or 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in 
treatment INS is randomly chosen as the relevant wage. 
 
2.2.1. Insider-outsider model: Only workers 1, 2, and 3 can vote 
In the first version of our model, to capture the features of a simple insider-outsider model, we 
assume that the three most productive workers form a union and vote for the uniform wage 
that each employed worker receives. Once the wage has been chosen, each worker receives 
the chosen wage. Non-employment occurs if w > Qi. 
Assume that preferences over employment and wages for each union member are given 
by: 
i
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where λ represents the utility weight that each worker puts on the aggregate 
employment level, L. We assume that λ is the same for all workers; allowing for individual 
differences in the parameter is a straightforward extension of our analysis. 
The productivities (we often refer to them as “outputs”) used in the lab experiment are 
Q1 = 100, Q2 = 50, Q3 = 33, Q4 = 25, and Q5 = 20.5 
                                                 
5 In order to simplify the analysis we assume that all employment and wages levels in the utility function 
are multiple of 100. Hence, we set Q3 = 100/3 (instead of 33). This assumption seems justifiable, since it is 
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Proposition 1: For each value of λ ≥ 0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium: 
• If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3) = (Q1,Q2,Q3). 
• If λ > 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3) = (Q5,Q5,Q5). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The result shows that when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower weight on 
employment levels than they put on the wage levels, workers vote for the highest possible 
wage that would maximize their earnings. As a result, the employment level is low. When 
λ > 1, workers put more weight on employment levels than they put on their wage levels. As a 
result all workers are willing to accept a wage cut to help other workers get a job. All workers 
vote for the lowest feasible wage. There is full employment. 
 
2.2.2. All five workers can vote 
We now consider the case where all five workers submit a wage proposal. This turns out to be 
a straightforward generalization of the analysis in the previous section. 
 
Proposition 2: For each value of λ ≥ 0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium:  
• If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5) = (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5). 
• If λ > 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5) = ( Q5, Q5, Q5, Q5, Q5). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix 
 
The result extends the result in Proposition 1 to the case where five workers (instead of 
three) vote on the wage level. Again when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower 
weight on employment levels than they put on the wage levels, the employment level is low 
as workers vote for a high wage, and vice versa. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
unlikely that the experimentally observed behavior would be significantly different for Q3 = 100/3 instead of 
Q3 = 33. In the experiment it was easier to use integers. 
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2.2.3. Discussion of the theoretical results 
The conditions on λ in Propositions 1 and 2 are relatively straightforward to interpret. Let us 
assume that λ = 1. In this case the utility for worker 1, under different employment and wage 
level combinations, are (100)∙(1), (50)∙(2), (33.3)∙(3), (25)∙(4), and (20)∙(5), where the first 
number in the bracket is the wage level, and the second number indicates the employment 
level. We see that in this case, worker 1 is indifferent between any of those cases and would 
be willing to go all the way down to w = 20, where the employment level is 5, or accept any 
other wage-employment combination. The same applies for workers 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
If λ < 1, the weight that each worker assigns to the employment level relative to the 
wage is lower. Higher wages combined with lower employment levels result in higher utilities 
for every worker. Hence it would be more costly for every worker to vote for a lower wage 
and thereby ensure that less productive workers get a job. If λ > 1, the reverse is true: higher 
employment levels result in higher utilities for every workers, and it is therefore less costly 
for workers to accept a wage cut and thereby ensure that the less productive workers get 
employed. 
Our results are a combination of the choice of the specific form of nonlinear preferences 
and productivities chosen for the experiment. With different preferences, and the same 
productivities, or the same utility and different productivities, there would be different Nash 
equilibria. However the qualitative conclusions for a high (low) λ would be the same: a high λ 
implies that workers care more about other workers and would be more willing to accept 
wage cuts in order to help workers that are less productive than themselves. 
 
2.2.4. Empirical implications from the theoretical results 
The first prediction from our model is that wage proposals are the same when union 
membership is restricted to three workers and when all five workers vote. In both cases, a low 
λ implies that workers vote for the highest feasible wage and low employment, whereas a high 
λ guarantees that workers are willing to accept wage cuts in order to help other workers get a 
job. Naturally, the resulting wages are expected to be different because of the median voter 
scheme. 
The second prediction comes from a simple fact: it is more expensive for more 
productive types to help workers who are less productive. Worker 1 must accept a wage cut of 
50 points in order to help worker 2 get a job, whereas worker 4 must only accept a wage cut 
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of 5 points to help worker 5 get a job. Although our model predicts bang-bang solutions with 
either full selfishness or full employment, our behavioral expectation is that more productive 
workers are less likely to go down to the next wage level that increases employment. Our 
theoretical result is implied by the specific functional form of the utility function and the 
assumption of uniform λ across workers, and other assumptions would yield different 
predictions. 
The third prediction is that more pro-social workers, i.e. workers with higher λ in our 
model, perhaps because of altruism or inequality aversion, are more likely to propose lower 
wages. 
Finally, we can note that, because votes in our model reveal the worker’s true 
preferences, it would not make a difference to their proposals whether, instead of having the 
setup considered in this model, we had a unilateral determination of the wage by one of the 
workers. It will be handy to refer to this observation as a fourth prediction, though of course 
not one explicitly made within the model itself. The accountability effect referred to in the 
introduction would, of course, imply a direct violation of this fourth prediction. 
 
2.3. Experimental procedure 
The computer-based experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of 
the University of Munich in 2011, using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). 440 students from all disciplines 
participated in 22 sessions, each with 20 participants. Approximately 61% of participants 
were female. Sessions lasted a bit more than an hour, and the average payoff was 15.64 euro, 
including a show-up fee of 4 euro. 
Upon arrival, experimental participants were seated in separate cubicles. Each session 
started with instructions for the main part of the experiment (described in detail in Section 
2.1). At this stage it was made clear that there would be additional parts of the experiments, 
but that the instructions for these parts would only be handed out after the completion of the 
current part. It was also stressed to participants that decisions in one part would be completely 
unrelated to those in the other parts. Participants received written instructions (see the online 
appendix), which were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. Everybody had the 
opportunity to ask questions in private. 
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We implemented a random lottery mechanism (e.g., Starmer and Sugden, 1991), paying 
only one out of the ten periods in the first part of the experiment. Such a payment scheme 
avoids monetary complementarities (e.g., wealth effects) between periods that are supposed 
theoretically to be completely independent. The payoff-relevant period was randomly selected 
at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate for experimental points into euro (1 
experimental point equals 0.25 euro) was clearly stated in the instructions. At the end of each 
period, every worker was informed about the chosen wage level within the group of five 
workers (and whether it was the median or a randomly chosen proposal) and about the income 
of all workers in his or her group. Individual proposals of other workers were never revealed. 
Upon completion of the main part of the experiment participants received instructions 
for the second part that were again read aloud. Remaining questions were only allowed to be 
asked privately, and also answered privately. The second part was a social preference 
elicitation task providing an independent test for social preferences taken from Kerschbamer 
(2012; see the appendix). This was closest in design to the individual allocation task, and 
more distant in design, as q increases from 0, to the other treatments with median voting. 
Subjects are randomly matched with another participant in each of ten binary decisions that 
allocate a certain payoff to oneself and to the matched participant. One of the ten allocation 
decisions is paid out for real to the decision maker and the matched participant, where the 
payoff-relevant allocation decision is randomly determined at the end of the experiment. The 
ten decisions allow identifying different distributional preferences non-parametrically. Details 
on the procedure are provided in the appendix. 
After this, additional individual tasks followed in the third and final part of the 
experiment: specifically, incentivized measurements of individual risk and ambiguity 
preferences using a standard choice list procedure (Holt and Laury, 2002; Engle-Warnick and 
Laszlo, 2006; see online appendix for details), two psychological inventories (Stöber’s, 2001, 
social desirability scale and Cacioppo et al.’s, 1984, need for cognition test),6 and a couple of 
questions regarding socio-demographics and individual background. The final stage of the 
experiment included feedback on the randomly selected payoff-relevant decisions in parts 1, 2 
                                                 
6 The first is a control for experimenter demand (Zizzo, 2010); the second is a control for intellectual 
curiosity. 
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and 3 of the experiment as well as on consequent individual earnings. Payments to subjects 
were made privately and in cash.  
 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Overview of choices 
We start by giving an overview of the average chosen wage levels in the eight treatments. 
Remember that the wage can be determined by the median vote of the eligible workers or by a 
randomly chosen individual worker. Thus, it makes sense to distinguish between a total 
average (TOT) and an average including only those cases in which the median was decisive 
(MED) and not an according-to-probability-q randomly selected group member. Only for 
MED, the median voter prediction based on selfish decision makers holds. For TOT-
predictions based on selfish decision makers one has to take the probabilities that a single 
member can be decisive into account. Table 3 provides the results. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
 
One can see that the actual figures in Table 3 are close to the predictions based on the 
assumptions for rational and selfish decision makers (see the numbers in parentheses in the 
eight cells). Obviously, it is more informative to look at averages contingent on types, and we 
thus refrain from running non-parametric tests on the differences in Table 3. We provide 
averages, contingent on types, in Table 4. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here.) 
 
There are several ways to slice the data in Table 4. We start by comparing wage 
proposals in the insider-outsider treatments (three voters) with proposals in the all-workers 
treatments (five voters), contingent on the type of worker. There is no significant difference 
between the two treatments for types 1 and types 2 (Mann-Whitney-U-tests on the individual 
level (average over the ten periods); p > 0.56 in both cases; q-regimes are collapsed, i.e. N = 
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88).7 Only for types 3, wage proposals in the insider-outsider treatments (three voters) are 
weakly significantly lower than in the all-workers treatments (five voters) (Mann-Whitney-U-
test; p = 0.07; q-regimes are collapsed, i.e. N = 88). However, remember that types 3 are only 
pivotal in the Nash equilibrium with λ < 1 in the all-workers treatments. Therefore, if 
anything, we would expect a lower average wage proposal for them in the all-workers 
treatments, whereas the opposite is the case. Hence, one can conclude that there does not 
seem to be a significant treatment effect in support of union models that take employment into 
account. In other words, insiders do not seem to lower their wage proposals in order to 
increase employment compared to the all-workers case. This is in line with our first 
prediction. 
Obviously, a deviation from the selfish prediction in q = 0.8 and q = 0.2 makes only 
sense if one deviates to a wage level that ensures employment for at least one other worker. 
This is especially important for type-2 workers in the insider-outsider treatments (potentially 
going from a wage of 50 to a wage of 33 or lower) and for type-3 workers in the all-workers 
treatments (potentially going from a wage of 33 to a wage of 25 or lower) with q = 0.8.8 
An alternative way of slicing the data is provided by comparing across the four q-
regimes, holding the number of voters (three or five) constant, contingent on worker types. 
The hypothesis would be that there is a significant decline of wage proposals with declining q 
and from ex ante to ex post for types 1 to 3. Although we will have a closer look at the 
influence of q on wage proposals in the subsequent section, a first impression is given by two-
sided Kruskal-Wallis tests. Interestingly, most tests are not significant non-parametrically. 
The only two comparisons that come close to significant differences across the four q-regimes 
are for types 1 in all-workers treatments (p = 0.04) and types 4 in all-workers treatments (p = 
0.09). Whereas the wage proposals for types 1 are decreasing with decreasing q (in line with 
other-regarding preferences extended to uncertainty or with a relatively high λ), they are, on 
average, increasing for types 4 (clearly contradicting preferences for the worst-off worker, i.e. 
type 5, but potentially in line with general other-regarding preferences). 
However, it is much easier to control for several determinants of wage proposals in a 
parametric regression analysis, following in the next section. In the regression, we shall also 
                                                 
7 All p values reported in this paper are two-sided. 
8 An online appendix shows the distribution of wage proposals, split up according to treatments and types. 
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control for the development over the ten periods. Furthermore, the regression allows 
controlling for individual measures of other-regarding preferences and uncertainty 
preferences. 
 
3.2. Econometric analysis  
We continue with a regression analysis of our data. Table 5 contains a multiple level random 
effects regression model on the wage proposal. 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here.) 
 
It simultaneously controls for the non-independence of observations at the level of 
subjects (since each subject makes ten choices) and at the level of the group (since a common 
history is established in each group after the first period). Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 
are dummy variables for workers of the respective type (e.g., Type 1 = 1 with a type 1 worker, 
else 0). Treatment Group is our q-varying accountability effect variable. It is equal to 1 with 
the treatments with only a 20% chance that one worker is chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage 
setter based on his or her proposal; to 2 with the treatments with a 80% chance that one 
worker is chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter; to 3 with the treatments where one 
worker is always chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter; and to 4 with the treatments 
where one worker is chosen ex ante to be the dictatorial wage setter. Incentivized enables us to 
control for whether a decision is incentivized, as most are, or not; specifically, it is a dummy 
equal to 1 if a decision is incentivized, which is always the case with Treatment Groups 1-3 
and with the ex-ante dictator of Treatment Group 4. INS is the treatment dummy for whether 
everyone is an insider to the trade union (= 1) or whether only three workers are (= 0). Period 
captures the period, between 1 and 10, and hence within-experiment experience. Prior 
Experience (= 1 for subjects with experience in previous, albeit unrelated, experiments) is a 
dummy capturing between-experiments as opposed to within-experiment experience. 
Inequality Averse and Altruist are dummies for whether a subject has been respectively 
classified as inequality averse or altruist using our independent social preference elicitation 
task (see the appendix), a standard incentivized measurement of social preferences following 
Kerschbamer (2012).  
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Finally, we include some interaction variables involving the type dummies with (a) 
Treatment Group, to enable us to verify the sensitivity of type dummies effects to changes in 
q and how close the decision environment is to that of a unionized labor market, or (b) 
Inequality Averse, as behavior of subjects classified as inequality averse by the preference 
elicitation task may change depending on where they stand in terms of type, or (c) Altruist, 
for similar reasons in relation to subjects classified as altruists.9 
A potential limitation of the regression in Table 5 is that it does not control for the fact 
that wage proposals are bounded between 1 and 100. Table 6 presents random effects Tobit 
regressions on the wage proposal controlling for the non-independence of observations at the 
level of subjects; we solve the problem of non-independence of observation at the level of 
groups, as separate from the non-independence of observations at the level of subjects, by 
running regressions partitioned by subject type: for example, the regression by type 1 includes 
only wage proposals made by type 1 in the experiment. 
 
(Insert Table 6 about here.) 
 
One of the results from the descriptive analysis of Section 3.1 is that, in line with the 
first empirical prediction of our model, full or partial union membership do not affect wage 
proposals for the worker types that make proposals in both cases (types 1, 2 and 3); this 
remains the case in the regression analysis (e.g., in relation to Table 5, p = 0.88). Another 
result from the descriptive analysis is that wage proposals are sensitive to the worker type. 
Table 6 corroborates this finding, with the highest wage proposals observed for type 1 
workers (p < 0.001), followed at a distance by type 2 (p < 0.001), followed by type 3 (p < 
0.02), with no significant difference observed between type 4 and type 5 workers. These 
observations are in line with the second empirical prediction of our model. 
                                                 
9 An online appendix presents regressions that control for a number of other individual characteristics, 
namely risk attitude, ambiguity attitude, inconsistency of choices, sensitivity to social pressure (social 
desirability), age, gender and economics study. All the qualitative results of this section are replicated, though 
the evidence for an effect of Treatment Group on Type 1 wage proposals, referred to below, is stronger (p = 
0.044) in the equivalent of Table 6.  
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In relation to type 1 workers, this result has to be seen however in combination in Table 
5 with the statistical significance of the negative coefficient on Type 1 × Treatment Group (p 
= 0.001), or equivalently of Treatment Group in the type 1 Tobit regression of Table 6 (p = 
0.06). Put it differently, Type 1 workers make lower wage proposals, i.e. behave more kindly, 
when the decision environment is closer to that of the individual allocation task and the 
preference elicitation task; but, as the decision environment becomes closer to that of a trade 
union setting (i.e., Treatment Group is lower), this effect disappears. This is consistent with 
an accountability effect as discussed in the introduction, but inconsistent with the fourth 
prediction of our model: whether the decision environment mirrors an individual allocation 
task or a voting game should not matter. 
 
Result 1. Having a full membership or partial membership trade union does not 
affect wage proposals. This fits the first prediction of our model. 
 
Result 2. Wage proposals are differentiated by worker type and in the direction 
predicted by our model. This fits our second prediction. 
 
Result 3. Type 1 workers behave less kindly the more the decision environment is 
closer to that which one would expect from a trade union wage setting as opposed 
to an individual allocation task. This is consistent with an accountability effect but 
inconsistent with the fourth prediction of our model. 
 
Being classified as inequality averse in the preference elicitation task does partially 
compensate for the strategic incentive for a high wage proposal for type 1 workers (p < 0.001 
in Table 5 and p < 0.01 in Table 6), but only partially so: e.g., the marginal effect for the wage 
proposal of being type 1 in the union wage environment (Treatment Group = 1) is still of the 
order of around + 62 experimental points even for inequality averse subjects based on Table 
5. Table 5 also shows some evidence of an effect of being classified as altruist in the 
preference elicitation task on lower wage proposals (p = 0.07), but the coefficient is less than 
half as large as that for inequality averse, and is not robust enough to achieve statistical 
significance in the Table 6 Tobit regression for type 1 (p = 0.47). For type 1 workers, a lower 
wage proposal can unequivocally be interpreted as leading to lower inequality, and so the 
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predictive power of inequality aversion for type 1 workers is consistent with the third 
prediction of our model, though obviously our model is silent on the differential predictive 
power of our proxies for altruistic and inequality averse preferences. We are not able to find 
other evidence of the predictive power of the social preference elicitation task except insofar 
as inequality averse type 5 workers tend to offer higher wage proposals than if they are not 
inequality averse according to Table 6 (p = 0.01). 
 
Result 4. Being classified as inequality averse in the preference elicitation task 
predicts kind behavior for type 1 workers, which is consistent with the third 
prediction of our model. It is a better predictor of kinder behavior by type 1 
workers than being classified as altruist. 
 
The coefficient on Period is only marginally significant in Table 5 (p = 0.08); based on 
Table 6, within-experiment experience does appear to bring higher wage proposals for type 1 
workers (p < 0.05) and type 2 workers (p < 0.02), though the effect is quantitatively small. 
Experience in prior but unrelated experiments instead predicts higher wage proposals (p < 
0.001 in Table 5), an effect that appears largely driven by and is large for type 1 workers (p < 
0.01, Table 6), for which such experience predicts a higher wage proposals by around 60 
points. This, of course, may be due not to learning but rather to sample selection: e.g., more 
self-interested subjects may be more likely to participate in experiments to make money, 
implying lower λ and therefore higher wage proposals in our model. Motivation clearly 
matters in at least another sense, in that, unsurprisingly, incentivized choices lead to higher 
wage proposals (p < 0.001 in Table 5; robust for type 1, 2 and 4 workers in Table 6). 
 
Result 5. Having participated in previous, albeit unrelated, experiments leads to 
higher wage proposals, whether due to learning or motivation leading to sample 
selection. Motivation, in the form of incentivized choices, leads to higher wage 
proposals. Learning, in the form of repeated play within the experiment, leads to 
higher wage proposals for type 1 workers. 
 
(Insert Table 7 about here.) 
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It may also be instructive to run a Tobit regression on wage proposals for period 1 only, 
as this enables us to use the wage proposals of each subject as an independent observation, 
due to the lack of a common history. We do this in Table 7. Results 1 through 4 are generally 
supported: there is no effect of INS, worker types’ behavioral differences are large and along 
the lines of insider-outsider theories (e.g. p < 0.001 for type 1), and inequality aversion leads 
to lower wage proposals for type 1 workers (p < 0.001), though a smaller period 1 effect 
exists also for type 2 (p < 0.05) and type 3 workers (p = 0.05); we also confirm the lack of 
robustness on the results of Altruist, as being classified as altruist does not predict lower wage 
proposals. Whether choices are incentivized does not seem to matter in period 1 (p = 0.53), 
qualifying Result 5, but the significance of prior experimental experience in predicting higher 
wage proposals carries through (p = 0.001). 
 
Result 6. Results 1 through 4 are robust if we focus only on period 1 wage 
proposals. In relation to Result 5, prior experimental experience matters for 
period 1 wage proposals. 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
We implemented a very stylized wage setting based on union members voting on their 
preferred wages and, consequently, implementing a certain employment level. Workers are 
heterogeneous in terms of their productivity, and there is thus a conflict among selfish 
workers with regard to the optimal wage. In line with our theoretical prediction, there is no 
difference in wage proposals between a setting in which all five workers vote on the wage 
level and a setting in which only the three most productive workers are allowed to vote. The 
more the voting system is transformed from a median voter scheme to an individual allocation 
task, the more employment levels are taken into account by workers. In other words, on 
average, wages go down to allow less productive workers being employed. Overall, the level 
of pro-social preferences we found is small; however, independent measures of pro-social 
preferences are still a good predictor for wage proposals of workers. 
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Our setup incorporates an allocation decision into a labor market setting and 
disentangles the effects from the individual allocation task and the median voter decision by 
union members. Both the union framing and the gradual transformation from a median voter 
scheme to a dictator scheme are unique in the behavioral economics literature. They allow for 
new insights and several potential extensions beyond this paper. Naturally, one has to exercise 
caution when generalizing the results from the experiment to real wage setting environments. 
It was not the aim of this experiment to capture the peculiarities of natural institutions and the 
behavior of unions. Nonetheless, there are a couple of findings from the experiment that 
provide important implications for the real world. First, voting systems in allocation tasks 
seem to have the tendency to reduce accountability and, thus, lead to more selfish outcomes 
than systems in which single decision makers, though still anonymous, can be held 
accountable. Second, the size of the union does not seem to play a large role in the allocative 
function through wage setting beyond the mechanic effect of the median voter scheme. Of 
course, it is possible that the size of the union is important in another dimension, namely in 
determining the power of a union, which we neglected here. 
Extending our setup is a straightforward issue. Several dimensions seem worthwhile 
investigating. One could think of varying the parameters of our setup, especially the 
distribution and the exact choice of productivity levels of workers. One could also introduce 
uncertainties over certain aspects of the interaction. Finally, it seems interesting to analyze 
different forms of interaction among union members beyond the stylized voting game used 
here. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Wages and employment 
Wage level (in experimental points) These worker types are employed 
1 – 20 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
21 – 25 1, 2, 3, 4 
26 – 33 1, 2, 3 
34 – 50 1, 2 
51 – 100 1 
 
 
Table 2: Treatment overview 
 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 (EX-POST) q = 0 (EX-ANTE) 
Five voters INS-0.8 
N = 60 
INS-0.2 
N = 60 
INS-0 (EX-POST) 
N = 60 
INS-0 (EX-ANTE) 
N = 60 
Three voters INSOUT-0.8 
N = 60 
INSOUT-0.2 
N = 60 
INSOUT-0 (EX-
POST) 
N = 40 
INSOUT-0 (EX-ANTE) 
N = 40 
Note: N denotes the number of participants in the respective treatment 
 
Table 3: Average chosen wage levels (selfish prediction in parentheses) 
 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 (EX-POST) q = 0 (EX-ANTE) 
Five 
voters 
MED: 30.73 
TOT: 33.43 
(w = 33 for MED) 
MED: 34.52 
TOT: 45.43 
(w = 33 for MED) 
MED: not applicable 
TOT: 41.62 
(w = 45.6 for TOT) 
MED: not applicable 
TOT: 45.58 
(w = 45.6 for TOT) 
Three 
voters 
MED: 45.87 
TOT: 50.82 
(w = 50 for MED) 
MED: 46.00 
TOT: 64.68 
(w = 50 for MED) 
MED: not applicable 
TOT: 56.26 
(w = 61 for TOT) 
MED: not applicable 
TOT: 60.64 
(w = 61 for TOT) 
MED refers to periods in which the median was decisive; TOT refers to the total average, including all periods. 
q = 0 (EX-ANTE) only includes incentivized choices. 
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Table 4: Average wage proposal by relevant types (selfish predictions in parentheses) 
 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 (EX-POST) q = 0 (EX-ANTE) 
Five voters T1: 88.71 (100) 
T2: 50.25 (50) 
T3: 34.03 (33) 
T4: 20.13 (25) 
T5: 19.23 (20) 
T1: 79.79 (100) 
T2: 43.84 (50) 
T3: 38.05 (33) 
T4: 28.04 (25) 
T5: 24.68 (20) 
T1: 79.04 (100) 
T2: 47.83 (50) 
T3: 31.68 (33) 
T4: 24.91 (25) 
T5: 18.90 (20) 
T1: 80.79 (100) 
T2: 44.40 (50) 
T3: 31.72 (33) 
T4: 24.32 (25) 
T5: 20.25 (20) 
Three voters T1: 87.10 (100) 
T2: 46.00 (50) 
T3: 32.31 (33) 
T1: 89.64 (100) 
T2: 46.45 (50) 
T3: 30.42 (33) 
T1: 72.16 (100) 
T2: 46.35 (50) 
T3: 30.59 (33) 
T1: 80.29 (100) 
T2: 42.86 (50) 
T3: 28.26 (33) 
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Table 5: Random effects regression on wage proposals 
 
n = 3600. The nested random effect regression simultaneously 
controls for both group level and subject level non-independence of 
observations.  
 
  
β t P
Type 1 88.539 12.19 0
Type 2 33.591 4.73 0
Type 3 17.243 2.44 0.015
Type 4 0.026 0 0.997
Treatment Group 2.158 1.17 0.243
Type 1 x Treatment Group -7.489 -3.39 0.001
Type 2 x Treatment Group -2.178 -1 0.316
Type 3 x Treatment Group -1.301 -0.6 0.549
Type 4 x Treatment Group 1.815 0.73 0.464
Ins 0.266 0.16 0.875
Prior Experience 13.329 4.69 0
Incentivized 5.168 5.19 0
Inequality Averse 9.827 1.86 0.062
Altruist 4.062 0.9 0.368
Type 1 x Inequality Averse -26.801 -4.36 0
Type 2 x Inequality Averse -10.73 -1.74 0.081
Type 3 x Inequality Averse -10.951 -1.8 0.071
Type 4 x Inequality Averse -3.856 -0.56 0.573
Type 1 x Altruist -10.791 -1.82 0.069
Type 2 x Altruist -4.816 -0.85 0.395
Type 3 x Altruist -1.18 -0.2 0.84
Type 4 x Altruist -4.973 -0.74 0.461
Period 0.116 1.76 0.079
Constant -4.671 -0.69 0.493
Log Likelihood -14350.54
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Table 6: Tobit effects regression on wage proposals, partitioned by type 
 
n = 880 (for each of Types 1, 2, 3 regressions); 480 (for each of Types 4 and 5 regressions). Note that by 
definition there are only Type 4 and Type 5 observations when everyone is an insider to the union and so only 
in treatments where Ins = 1; this variable therefore drops off from these regressions. These regressions control 
for subject level non-independence of observations and, since they are on wage proposals by worker type and 
there is only one worker type per group, simultaneously control for group level non-independence. Left 
censored obs. and right censored obs. are the numbers of wage proposals set at the minimum of 1 and the 
maximum of 100, respectively.  
  
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
β t P β t P β t P
Treatment Group -12.995 -1.87 0.061 -0.707 -0.79 0.43 -0.938 -1.03 0.304
Ins -2.97 -0.2 0.838 1.578 0.83 0.407 3.03 1.72 0.086
Prior Experience 71.345 2.79 0.005 7.626 2.06 0.04 3.383 0.8 0.424
Incentivized 31.689 4.97 0 3.201 2.65 0.008 -0.143 -0.09 0.93
Inequality Averse -50.102 -3.01 0.003 -1.323 -0.6 0.547 -1.776 -0.92 0.359
Altruist -14.693 -0.72 0.471 -1.686 -0.7 0.485 1.892 0.77 0.443
Period 1.124 1.98 0.047 0.227 2.54 0.011 -0.044 -0.49 0.623
Constant 91.62 2.58 0.01 36.623 7.58 0 30.477 5.64 0
Log Likelihood
Left censored obs. 2 0 3
Right censored obs. 578 5 7
Type 4 Type 5
β t P β t P
Treatment Group 2.265 1.37 0.171 0.617 0.31 0.757
Ins
Prior Experience 0.35 0.04 0.966 11.743 2.38 0.017
Incentivized -5.432 -2.37 0.018 -0.391 -0.08 0.935
Inequality Averse 5.375 1.37 0.17 9.679 2.56 0.01
Altruist -0.445 -0.1 0.92 3.684 1.13 0.257
Period 0.063 0.35 0.729 -0.084 -0.52 0.601
Constant 21.22 2.17 0.03 6.062 0.66 0.51
Log Likelihood
Left censored obs. 21 22
Right censored obs. 14 10
-1713.03 -3141.32 -3128.55
-1807.12 -1758.40
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Table 7: Tobit effects regression on period 1 wage proposals 
 
n = 360. Left censored obs. and right censored obs. are the numbers 
of wage proposals set at the minimum of 1 and the maximum of 100, 
respectively.  
β t P
Type 1 102.47 8.95 0
Type 2 30.072 2.82 0.005
Type 3 22.013 2.08 0.039
Type 4 7.548 0.62 0.534
Treatment Group 1.56 0.54 0.591
Type 1 x Treatment Group -7.949 -2.32 0.021
Type 2 x Treatment Group -0.298 -0.09 0.927
Type 3 x Treatment Group -2.611 -0.8 0.426
Type 4 x Treatment Group 0.39 0.1 0.917
Ins -2.265 -0.92 0.358
Prior Experience 13.542 3.27 0.001
Incentivized 2.022 0.56 0.574
Inequality Averse 12.976 1.67 0.095
Altruist 3.164 0.47 0.64
Type 1 x Inequality Averse -41.586 -4.46 0
Type 2 x Inequality Averse -19.437 -2.14 0.033
Type 3 x Inequality Averse -17.391 -1.95 0.052
Type 4 x Inequality Averse -16.475 -1.64 0.103
Type 1 x Altruist 2.094 0.21 0.832
Type 2 x Altruist -9.255 -1.09 0.276
Type 3 x Altruist -3.506 -0.4 0.692
Type 4 x Altruist -9.442 -0.95 0.341
Constant 1.673 0.15 0.883
Log Likelihood
Left censored obs. 0
Right censored obs. 59
-1353.68
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
We first prove that the strategy profiles described in the proposition are Nash equilibria under 
the stated conditions on λ, and we then prove uniqueness.  
Consider the strategy profile (w1,w2,w3)=(Q1,Q2,Q3). To prove that wi=Qi is a unique 
best reply for worker i, we show that setting wi=Qi is a unique best reply ex post when i is 
decisive, and a (possibly non-unique) best reply ex post under the median rule. This then 
implies that wi=Qi is overall a unique best reply for worker i.  
When worker 1 is decisive, w1=Q1 is optimal if 
100 ≥  max{50(2) , (100/3)(3) , 25(4) ,20(5) }λ λ λ λ . 
This holds when λ≤1. Under the median rule, the median is w2=Q2. There are no 
upwards profitable deviations from w1=Q1. The only potentially profitable downwards 
deviation for worker is to w1≤w3=Q3, such that the median is lowered to w3. This deviation is 
suboptimal when λλ )3)(3/100()2(50 ≥ , or λ≤1.  
Similarly, when worker 2 is decisive, w2=Q2 is optimal when  
})5(20,)4(25,)3)(3/100max{()2(50 λλλλ > . This again holds when λ≤1. Under the 
median rule, the median is w2, and the only potentially optimal deviation for worker 2 is to set 
w2≤w3=Q3. As before, this is unprofitable when λλ )3)(3/100()2(50 > , or λ≤1. 
Finally, when worker 3 is decisive w3=Q3 is optimal when 
})5(20,)4(25max{)3)(3/100( λλλ > . Once more, this is satisfied when λ≤1.  Under the median 
rule, worker 3 has no job at the median w2, and cannot lower the median. The median can be 
raised to Q1 by setting w3≥w1, but worker 3 then remains unemployed and employment drops, 
so this deviation is unprofitable for worker 3. We thus conclude that (w1,w2,w3)=(Q1,Q2,Q3) is 
a Nash equilibrium when 0≤λ≤1. 
Consider then the strategy profile (w1,w2,w3)=(Q5,Q5,Q5). When decisive, w1=Q5 is 
optimal for worker 1 when })4(25,)3)(3/100(,)2(50,100max{)5(20 λλλλ > . This holds when 
λ>1.  Under the median rule, no deviation by worker 1 can change the median, so w1=Q5 is 
also optimal for worker 1 when the median worker is decisive.  
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When worker 2 is decisive, w2=Q5 is optimal when 
})4(25,)3)(3/100(,)2(50max{)5(20 λλλλ > , and this again holds when λ>1. Under the median 
rule worker 2 again cannot affect the median, so w2=Q5 is optimal. 
Finally, consider worker 3. When he is decisive, w3=Q5 is optimal when 
})4(25,)3)(3/100max{()5(20 λλλ > , and this again holds when λ>1. As before, any deviation 
leaves the median unchanged, so payoffs under the median rule are maximized at w3=Q5. We 
thus conclude that (w1,w2,w3)=(Q5,Q5,Q5) is a Nash equilibrium when λ>1.  
 
Proving Uniqueness  
Consider an arbitrary strategy profile. The argument above shows that, if λ≤1, when worker i 
is decisive, then wi=Qi is a unique best reply. We now show that under the median rule 
worker i receives a payoff of wi=Qi that it at least as high as, or strictly higher than, the payoff 
from any other choice of wi. In other words, setting wi=Qi is a strictly dominant strategy for 
worker i=1,2,3, and this implies uniqueness. The fact that setting wi=Qi under the median rule 
is optimal follows from the fact that, whatever the other workers’ choices, worker i moves the 
median closest to her optimal value, which, when λ≤1, is Qi, by setting wi=Qi (other values of 
wi may be equally optimal, but wi=Qi is always among the set of optimal choices). To be 
more precise, suppose the median of the other workers’ wages is below Qi. Then setting 
wi=Qi either increases the overall median and brings it closer to Qi, or leaves it unchanged. In 
either case, wi=Qi is better or at least as good as any choice wi<Qi when λ≤1. Suppose next 
that the median of the other workers’ wages is above Qi. By setting wi=Qi the overall median 
is either lowered towards Qi or is the same as the median of the other workers’ wages. In the 
first case worker i is more likely to be employed under the median rule and employment can 
only increase, so i’s utility will also increase. In the second case i’s utility is the same under 
the median rule no matter what i decides, so setting wi=Qi is optimal. This shows that for each 
worker i setting wi=Qi is optimal under the median rule. Combining this with the fact that 
wi=Qi is uniquely optimal when worker i is decisive, shows that (w1,w2,w3)=(Q1,Q2,Q2) is a 
unique Nash equilibrium when 0≤λ≤1.   
Suppose then λ>1.  We again prove that setting wi=Q5 is a strictly dominant strategy for 
each worker i. We already know that when worker i is decisive, wi=Q5 is a unique best reply. 
Under the median rule, when λ>1 worker i’s best outcome is that the median wage is Q5. 
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Thus, it again follows that, no matter the other workers’ wage choices, worker i will want to 
bring the median as close to Q5 as possible; setting wi=Q5 is always the wage that 
accomplishes this objective. This shows that setting wi=Q5 is a strictly dominant strategy for 
each worker i when λ>1. This, in turn implies that the Nash equilibrium (w1,w2,w3)=(Q5, Q5, 
Q5) is unique when λ>1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We first show that when λ≤1 then the strategy profile where worker i sets wi=Qi, i=1,...,5, is a 
Nash equilibrium. A straightforward extension of the computations for the case where only 
workers 1, 2, and 3 could submit a wage shows that, when decisive, wi=Qi is uniquely optimal 
for worker i when λ≤1. We next show that wi=Qi is also optimal under the median rule. Given 
the profile (w1,...,w5)=(Q1,...,Q5), the median is q3. worker 1 can lower the median from Q3 to 
Q4 (but not by more) by setting w1≤Q4. This deviation is unprofitable when 
λλ )3)(3/100()4(25 ≤ , which holds since λ≤1. Also, no upwards deviation from wi=Q1 is 
profitable since it can only lead to being unemployed onself and a decrease in overall 
employment. Similarly, worker 2 can lower the median to Q4 by setting w2≤Q4. As for worker 
1, this is unprofitable whenever λ≤1. As for worker 1, no upwards deviation is profitable. 
Consider then worker 3. A deviation to w3≤Q4 again lowers the median to Q4, but, once more, 
λ≤1 implies that this, as well as any upwards deviation, is unprofitable. Both workers 4 and 5 
are unemployed under the median rule; no downwards deviation can affect the median and 
hence their chance of getting a job, so payoffs are the same. Also, no upwards deviation is 
profitable since that keeps them unemployed and reduces overall employment. Thus w4=Q4 
and w5=Q5 are optimal for workers 4 and 5 under the median rule. We thus conclude that 
when λ≤1 setting wi=Qi is a unique best reply to the profile 
(w1,w2,w3,w4,w5)=(Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5). 
Consider next the profile (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5)=(Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5). A straightforward 
generalization of the three-worker analysis shows that when λ>1 and worker i=1,2,3,4,5 is 
decisive, wi=Q5 is optimal. Next, consider payoffs under the median rule. Since the median is 
Q5 and no worker can affect the median by a deviation, each worker earns the same regardless 
of her choice of wage, so setting wi=Q5 is optimal. This proves that 
(w1,w2,w3,w4,w5)=(Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5) is a Nash equilibrium when λ>1. 
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Proving uniqueness 
The proof of uniqueness for the three-worker case extends immediately to the case of five 
workers.  
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Appendix B: Social preference elicitation task (based on 
Kerschbamer, 2012) 
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark) 
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive 
agent gets 
 you  
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark) 
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive 
agent gets 
 you 
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
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Translation of Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation Task 
into WTP  
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block (DIP) 
 
in the DIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPd proxy for WTP
d  
used 
1 +0.5 ≤   WTPd  +0.5 
2 +0.1  ≤   WTPd  < +0.5 +0.3 
3 +0.0  ≤   WTPd  < +0.1 +0.05 
4 -0.1 ≤   WTPd  < -0.0 -0.05 
5 -0.5 ≤   WTPd  < -0.1 -0.3 
never       WTPd  < -0.5 -0.5 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block (AIB) 
 
in the AIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPa proxy for WTP
a  
used 
1       WTPa  ≤ -0.5 -0.5 
2 -0.5  <  WTPa  ≤ -0.1 -0.3 
3 -0.1  <  WTPa  ≤ -0.0 -0.05 
4 +0.0 <  WTPa  ≤ +0.1 +0.05 
5 +0.1 <  WTPa  ≤ 0.5 +0.3 
never +0.5 <  WTPa    +0.5 
 
 
WTPd for WPTd > 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
increase the other's material payoff by one unit; 
 
for WPTd< 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
decrease the other's material payoff by one unit (in this interpretation 
inequalities need to be reversed; for instance, subjects who never switch on the 
X-list reveal that they are willing to give up at least 50 Cents of their own 
income to decrease the income of the other player by 1 Euro); 
 
WTPa defined similarly for the domain of advantageous inequality. 
 
